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HOW SHOULD THE POLICE RESPOND TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE ANALYSIS OF MANDATORY
ARREST
Dennis P. Saccuzzo*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the controversies surrounding
mandatory arrest. First, the article introduces the scope of
the problem by illustrating the way in which police officers
typically deal with domestic violence. Second, the article
provides a detailed explanation of the concept of "therapeutic
jurisprudence." The analysis will then begin with a discus-
sion of empirical studies pertaining to the effectiveness of
mandatory arrest. With the controversy and debate over
equivocal and conflicting results as a springboard, the discus-
sion then turns to what is perhaps a more fundamental issue.
Namely, what should be the goals of any police policy? Fi-
nally, the article proposes that through the effective use of
therapeutic jurisprudence, the process of re-education of the
batterer and the healing of the battered person can begin at
the moment of police contact and continue through the entire
judicial process.
A. Scope of the Problem
The enormity and extent of the problem of domestic vio-
* Dennis P. Saccuzzo is a Professor of Psychology at San Diego State Uni-
versity, Adjunct Professor of Psychiatry at the University of California, San Di-
ego, and Adjunct Professor of Law at California Western School of Law. He re-
ceived his Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from Kent State University in 1973 and
J.D. from California Western School of Law in 1997. He is a Diplomat and
Board Certified Clinical Psychologist of the American Board of Professional
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lence is well documented.' Furthermore, without societal in-
tervention, domestic violence will not only continue, but a
"significant" percentage of incidents will escalate to very se-
rious proportions.2 Among the societal responses to domestic
violence, perhaps none are more critical than those of the po-
lice.3 Unfortunately, the police response to pleas from bat-
tered women has been far less than adequate when viewed
from a historical perspective.4
1. A Case in Point
Consider the outrageous police indifference in the case of
Thurman v. City of Torrington.5 For more than eight months,
Tracey Thurman, along with her friends and relatives, made
innumerable calls to the police in the town of Torrington,
Connecticut.' She and others notified the police of repeated
and brutal threats upon her life and the life of her child by
her estranged husband, Charles J. Thurman.7 The police ig-
nored or rejected Tracey's cries for help and Charles' threats
to kill or maim her, with tragic consequences!
As chronicled by the U.S. District Court, Charles
Thurman attacked Tracey Thurman at the home of a friend
in October of 1982 and, a few days later, returned and used
physical force to remove Charles J. Thurman, Jr. from the
premises. Despite formal complaints, the police did nothing.9
The police indifference continued as Charles Thurman
screamed threats at Tracey Thurman in the presence of po-
lice officers, kicked in her windshield, and made repeated
threats of violence. ° Finally, Charles was placed on proba-
1. See, e.g., EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, Extent of the Problem, in
DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK 1-13 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G.
Buzawa eds., 1996) [hereinafter BUZAWA & BUZAWA, Extent of the Problem]
(citing the National Criminal Victimization Survey (NCVS) estimated figure
between 1987 and 1991 that on average more than 572,000 violent acts were
committed against women by an intimate).
2. See id. at 4 (citing empirical evidence conducted since the 1970s).
3. See id.
4. See Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of Criminology on Criminal
Law: Evaluating Arrest for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1992).
5. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
6. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1524 (D. Conn. 1984).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1525.
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tion. However, when Charles threatened to kill Tracey, the
police refused to take the complaint." When Tracey asked for
a restraining order on a Friday, the police told her she would
have to wait until after the Memorial holiday weekend.' 2
Complaints by Tracey's brother-in-law also fell on deaf ears."
The police advised Tracey's brother-in-law that Charles
would be arrested; yet there was no arrest.'4
Finally, the inevitable happened. On June 10, 1983,
Charles went to Tracey's home.' While Tracey was trying to
persuade him not to hurt Charles Jr., Charles Thurman be-
gan his violent and brutal attack."6 He stabbed Tracey in her
neck, her throat, and her chest.'7 The police arrived and
watched while Charles kicked Tracey, who was on the ground
and bleeding, in the head.'8 They stood by even after he
dropped Charles Jr. on her. 9 Tracey ultimately became
paralyzed below the neck and suffered permanent disfigure-
ment."
2. Tradition of Inadequate Police Response
Graphic stories of the consequences of an inadequate po-
lice response to domestic violence are all too common. As Eve
S. Buzawa and Carl G. Buzawa note, the classic response of
the police to domestic violence can be summed by three char-
acteristics: "(a) relatively few of the potential universe of do-
mestic violence cases were ever formally addressed by the
police, the majority being screened out, (b) the police did not
desire to intervene in family disputes, and (c) there was a
strong, sometimes overwhelming bias against making ar-
rests."'"
11. Id. at 1521.
12. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
19. Id. at 1526.
20. See EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 102 (2d. ed. 1996) [hereinafter BUZAWA &
BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE].
21. Id. at 37.
1999] 767
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
3. Movement Toward Mandatory Arrest
As a result of bad publicity, fears of liability, and empiri-
cal studies,22 the problem of an inadequate police response to
domestic violence was finally addressed in a number of stat-
utes beginning in the late 1970s.23 Among the most contro-
versial of the new laws are those that require mandatory ar-
rest in the fight against domestic violence.24
Central to the analysis is an examination of mandatory
arrest in terms of the messages conveyed by any given police
action.25 According to a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis,
decisions pertaining to arrest and prosecution have mental
health as well as societal implications for both the battered
person and the batterer.26 Therapeutic jurisprudence pro-
vides an analytical framework that goes beyond the barren
numbness of statistics and experimental design flaws.27
Thus, the police response to domestic violence can be guided
by a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Concept of Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Therapeutic jurisprudence examines how the response of
the legal system advances or impedes therapeutic goals.28 It
is the process by which the actions of the legal system have
therapeutic consequences. In therapeutic jurisprudence, the
goal is to make decisions that affect behavior in a positive
way, such as to begin the healing process for victims of do-
mestic violence or the rehabilitation process for batterers.
Mandatory arrest, for example, provides a strong and impor-
tant message that violence against women is serious and will
not be tolerated. When the batterer is taken into custody,
22. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
23. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 20, at 121.
24. See Marion Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating
Domestic Violence, But Is It Enough? U. ILL. L. REV. 533 (1996).
25. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
26. See Leonore M. J. Simon, The Legal Processing of Domestic Violence
Cases, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL DISORDER 440-63 (Bruce D. Sales &
Daniel W. Shuman eds., 1996).
27. See Simon, supra note 26.
28. See Michael L. Perlin, What is Therapeutic Jurisprudence? 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 6223 (1993).
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law enforcement officials communicate to him," as well as
the battered woman, that battering is a criminal act for
which the batterer is responsible."
1. Cognitive Approach
Modern approaches to therapeutic jurisprudence are
based on a theory of human behavior known as the cognitive
approach."' The focus of the cognitive approach is on think-
ing patterns, such as beliefs and expectations.32 In cognitive
therapy, the goal is to improve personal functioning and
mental health by altering self-defeating thought patterns and
providing new ways of evaluating internal and external
events.3
The cognitive approach holds that conscious thought pro-
cesses play a major role in mediating human behavioral and
emotional responses.34 Therapeutic approaches to mentally
or emotionally disturbed persons focus on automatic thought
patterns that are exaggerated, distorted, mistaken, or unre-
alistic.35 Cognitive approaches to treatment attempt to mod-
ify a persons cognitions such as thoughts, beliefs, and expec-
tations. 6  In an approach known as rational emotive
therapy,37 for example, it is assumed that problem behaviors
29. While men are sometimes victims of domestic violence by women, and
in lesbian encounters the batterer is a woman, by far the vast majority of bat-
tering occurs in male assault of women.
30. See Simon, supra note 26, at 447 (citations omitted).
31. See id. at 443-44.
32. For an overview of the basic psychological theories of human function-
ing, see DENNIS P. SACCUZZO, PSYCHOLOGY: FROM RESEARCH TO APPLICATION
(1987). Briefly, there are four basic approaches. Id. The psychodynamic fo-
cuses on the role of thought processes of which the individual is unaware. Id.
The behavioral approach examines observable behavior. Id. The humanistic
approach emphasizes the role of present personal experience, the individual's
phenomenological perspective. Id. The cognitive approach, which is the most
recent theory to emerge, stresses the role of cognitions, thoughts, beliefs, expec-
tations on behavior. Id.
33. See Steven D. Hollon & Aaron T. Beck, Cognitive and Cognitive-
Behavioral Therapies, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND BEHAVIOR
CHANGE 428-66 (Allen E. Bergin & Sol L. Garfield eds., 1994).
34. See id. at 429.
35. See Simon, supra note 26, at 444 (citing W. E. Craighead et al., Unipo-
lar Depression, in CLINICAL BEHAVIOR THERAPY 99-116 (S. M. Turner, et al.,
eds., 2d ed. 1992).
36. See SACCUZZO supra note 32, at 551.
37. See ALBERT ELLIS, REASON AND EMOTION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 3 (1962).
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stem from irrational beliefs.38 An example of an irrational
belief is the belief that to be worthwhile, a person must be
thoroughly competent, adequate, and achieving in all possible
respects.39 In using cognitive therapy, the therapist would
challenge this idea, thus refraining a situation. In another
approach to cognitive therapy, known as Beck's Cognitive
therapy," the therapist attempts to alter negative self-
beliefs.4 One such belief is the belief that "nobody cares."42 A
cognitive therapist would attempt to challenge such a belief
by, for example, pointing out contrary evidence in an effort to
modify the client's thinking.4
3
2. The Cognitive Approach Applied to Domestic Violence
The Cognitive approach to therapeutic jurisprudence
analysis is helpful in the analysis of thought patterns of do-
mestic violence batterers, victims, and society at large. The
Cognitive approach attempts to discern how any response to
domestic violence, including a police response, might encour-
age or discourage faulty thinking patterns in batterers, vic-
tims and society. Leonore M. J. Simon, for example, has
identified four types of cognitive distortions that can be at-
tributed to the criminal justice response to domestic violence:
"(1) cognitive distortions that morally justify or euphemisti-
cally label the violence; (2) cognitive distortions that disavow
responsibility; (3) cognitive distortions that minimize the ef-
fects of violence; and (4) cognitive distortions that dehuman-
ize or blame the victim."4
A typical cognitive distortion is the idea that the woman
deserved to be beaten, or that there is nothing wrong with
beating one's wife. 5 In blaming the woman, the batterer jus-
tifies his violence; in finding nothing wrong, the batterer de-
nies responsibility for his behavior. Before analyzing how
concepts of cognitive therapy can be used to evaluate the po-
lice response to domestic violence, it is useful to examine the
present controversy over mandatory arrest and other possible
38. See SACCUZZO, supra note 32, at 551.
39. See SACCUZZO, supra note 32, at 554.
40. AARON T. BECK, DEPRESSION: CAUSES AND TREATMENT (1967).
41. See SACCUZZO, supra note 32, at 555.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. Simon, supra note 26, at 444.
45. See Simon, supra note 26, at 445.
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police responses. At the core of this debate are a host of con-
flicting empirical findings.
B. Empirical Data
Shortly after 1983, there was a dramatic shift in the po-
lice response to domestic violence.4" Instead of ignoring the
pleas of victims, as in Tracey Thurman's tragic story, police
departments across the nation adopted new policies of man-
datory arrest for cases of domestic violence.47 While publicity
over cases such as Tracey Thurman's and the threat of li-
ability for police departments played an important role in
this turnabout, perhaps the most important factor in this al-
most overnight change can be found in the publication of an
empirical study of the effects of mandatory arrest."
1. The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment
The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment49 was
hailed as one of the most rigorous studies of its kind."0
Funded by the National Institute for Justice and conducted
by the Police Foundation,51 the study involved a random as-
signment design.5" For two precincts in Minneapolis, violent
family offenders were randomly assigned to one of three ex-
perimental conditions.53 Batterers in the arrest condition
were subjected to mandatory arrest. 4 In the second condition
the police attempted to provide advice and mediate the dis-
pute." In the third condition the parties were temporarily
46. See Richard J. Gelles, Constraints Against Family Violence: How Well
Do They Work?, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 30-42 (Eve S.
Buzawa & Carl Buzawa eds., 1996).
47. See id.
48. See id. at 31-32.
49. See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent
Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984).
50. See Delbert S. Elliott, Criminal Justice Procedures in Family Violence
Crimes, in FAMILY VIOLENCE: 11 CRIME & JUST. 458 (Lloyd Oblin & Michael
Tonry eds., 1989).
51. See Gelles, supra note 46, at 32.
52. Through randomization, experimenters can rule out the effects of poten-
tially confounding variables so that group comparisons can be attributable to
treatment effects rather than to variables beyond the control of the experi-
menter. See SACCUZZO, supra note 32.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
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separated.56 To increase the rigor of the study, only cases in
which both parties were present when the police arrived and
in which the offense could be classified as a misdemeanor as-
sault were included.57
Results were striking. A six-month follow-up treatment
revealed the lowest rate of recidivism in the mandatory ar-
rest condition (ten percent)." The highest rate of recidivism
was found in parties who were merely separated (twenty-four
percent).5 The results of the study were published on April
5, 1983, in the New York Times, even before the methodology
was subjected to the rigors of scientific peer review. ° Just
ten days later, the New York Police Commissioner issued or-
ders that required mandatory arrest in domestic violence
cases, and by January of 1987, 176 cities across the United
States followed suit.
61
2. Critiques and Follow-Up Studies
Given the striking findings and dramatic impact of the
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, it is not sur-
prising that the study was soon subjected to scrutiny. To
their credit, the original authors of the study were quick to
point to flaws in the study.62 For example, given the unclear
distinctions between misdemeanor, felony, and non-
misdemeanor, the police may have violated the assumption of
random assignment, either by avoiding a domestic distur-
bance or by classifying it as felony or non-misdemeanor."
There were also problems with missing data, and the data
were further limited in that only a few police officers were ac-
tually involved. 64  The National Institute of Justice soon
funded a number of replication studies.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Sherman & Berk, supra note 49.
59. See id.
60. See Gelles, supra note 46, at 31.
61. See id.
62. See Richard A. Berk & Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Responses to Fam-
ily Violence Incidents: An Analysis of an Experimental Design with Incomplete
Randomization, 83 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N. 70 (1988).
63. See id. at 73-76.
64. See id.
772 [Vol. 39
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3. Failure to Replicate and Inconsistent Findings
The first attempt to replicate the Minneapolis findings
failed, creating confusion in the literature.65 Contrary to the
positive findings in Minneapolis, an experiment in Omaha,
Nebraska found no evidence that arrest deters batterers. As
the experimenters noted:
The failure to replicate the Minneapolis findings will un-
doubtedly cast some doubt on the deterrent power of a
mandatory or even a presumptive arrest policy for cases of
misdemeanor domestic assault. At this point, researchers
and policy makers are in the awkward position of having
conflicting results from two experiments and no clear, un-
ambiguous direction from the researchers on this issue.66
Commentators claimed that the movement to arrest bat-
terers may have been "doing more harm than good."" By the
early 1990s, results from some six replication studies had
been reported. 68 The results were a hodgepodge of often con-
flicting results.6 9 The overall conclusion seemed to be that
sometimes arrest works; sometimes it does not. Or, while
mandatory arrest may reduce violence for white victims, it
actually increases violence against poor, minority women
from the ghetto.0 Other attempts to make sense of appar-
ently disparate statistical outcomes argued that while arrest
may have some deterrent effect over the short-term, over the
long-term it actually increased violence." As Janell D.
Schmidt and Lawrence W. Sherman noted:
In short, the new experiments reported both deterrent and
backfiring effects of arrest. Arrest cured some abusers but
made others worse; arrest eased the pain for victims of
employed abusers but increased it for those intimate with
unemployed partners; arrest assisted white and Hispanic
victims but fell short of deterring further violence among
65. See F. W. Dunford et al., The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault: The
Omaha Police Experiment, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 183 (1990).
66. Id. at 204.
67. Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter Domestic
Violence?, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 43-53 (Eve S.
Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
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black victims.7"
Much ado was made about statistical significance.73
While many of the studies found differences between the
various treatments, most did not find results at the .05 level
of significance.74 Given that empirical findings are unclear or
contradictory and hinge on probabilities, on what basis can
we evaluate mandatory arrest? According to Lawrence
Sherman, the author of the original Minneapolis experiment,
given the current state of the data we should now move as
quickly to repeal mandatory arrest laws as we embraced
them following the initial positive findings.75 Is this prudent?
Would not the elimination of mandatory arrest simply re-
establish the original and unsatisfactory status quo? And
should we rely on cold numbers to decide on our police poli-
cies? A conclusion based on the therapeutic jurisprudence
approach would provide a negative response to all of these
questions.
III. ANALYSIS
A therapeutic jurisprudence approach examines the ef-
fect of any given criminal justice response from the stand-
point of its effect on the batterer, the battered person, and
72. Schmidt & Sherman, supra note 67, at 46.
73. For a brief overview of the concept of statistical significance and the ba-
sic underlying statistics, see SAccuzzo, supra note 32, at 572-585. Briefly, so-
cial scientists consider results to be statistically significant when the probabil-
ity of finding a particular result, such as a difference in the mean value of two
samples, is less than 5 out of 100. Such a finding is considered significant at
the .05 level and is designated (p < .05), which literally means the probability of
obtaining the result in question are less than 5/100. Because this is a low prob-
ability, researchers are willing to accept such findings as not being due to
chance, but rather as due to real differences between sample groups. See id. at
582.
74. See Schmidt & Sherman, supra note 67, at 54-80. To determine what is
rare, scientists have established a general rule. If the odds of getting a par-
ticular result by chance alone are less than 5 out of 100, the result is considered
statistically significant, or due to something other than chance. In the experi-
mental literature, a significant result is indicated by the statement p < .05, a
short way of saying, "The probability (p) of obtaining the result by chance is less
than (<) five out of 100." This statement tells the psychologist that the results
of the study are dependable. If the experiment were repeated, similar results
would most likely be found. SACCUZZO, supra note 32 at 582.
75. Lawrence Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal
Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1992).
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society.76 The real question then becomes one of evaluating
what message mandatory arrest sends. If the message serves
to empower the battered person, pin responsibility on the
batterer, and send a message to society that domestic vio-
lence will not be tolerated, then mandatory arrest should be
embraced regardless of statistical studies. As J. David
Hirschel and Ira W. Hutchison and their colleagues noted in
their final report to the National Institute of Justice,
[e]ven though arrest has not been shown to have particu-
lar deterrent value, and even if arrest may not have much
punitive value, it may still constitute a more conscionable
choice than non-arrest. Not to arrest may communicate to
men that abuse is not serious and to women that they are
on their own. It may communicate to children, who very
often witness abuse of their mothers, that the abuse of
women is tolerated, if not legitimated. It may communi-
cate to the public at large that a level of violence which is
unacceptable when inflicted by a stranger is acceptable
when inflicted by an intimate.77
A. Arguments in Favor of Mandatory Arrest
Let's assume that mandatory arrest of domestic violence
offenders actually does little to deter recidivism and can, in
some cases, even have negative effects such as increasing
violence. What valid or rational reason would there be for
such policy?78
1. Five Reasons in Favor of Mandatory Arrest
Assuming no deterrence effect, Evan Stark 9 provides five
76. See Simon, supra note 26.
77. See J. DAVID HIRSCHEL ET AL., CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT
REPLICATION PROJECT: FINAL REPORT (National Institute of Justice, 1991).
78. According to Michael Steinman,
Arrest imposes the most costs and no formal action imposes the fewest.
The costs imposed by arrest include a brief time in jail or the chance of
it and the possibility of being prosecuted and suffering court-mandated
penalties like a fine or a jail term. Arrest may also trigger indirect
costs for offenders such as humiliation, divorce or separation from
their partners, and loss of job.
MICHAEL STEINMAN, COORDINATED CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERVENTIONS AND
RECIDIVISM AMONG BATTERERS IN WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES,
221-22 (1991).
79. Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers: A Reply to Its Critics, in DO
ARREST AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 115-49 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G.
Buzawa eds., 1996).
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important reasons to support mandatory arrest for batter-
ers.8 ' First, mandatory arrest serves to control police behav-
ior.8 As Stark noted, "the absence of a standard for police
practice increased women's sense of powerlessness and thus
posed a major obstacle to their empowerment."82 Thus, man-
datory arrest serves to empower women.
Second, mandatory arrest provides protection from im-
mediate violence. 3 When the police stop short of arrest, a
battered woman remains vulnerable to further abuse and
violence. 4 Mandatory arrest not only removes this immedi-
ate threat, but also gives the battered person time to consider
her options and, if necessary, take evasive action.85
A third factor to consider in support of mandatory arrest
is its generally deterring effect."s Statistical studies have fo-
cused on the role of specific deterrence, that is, deterring fu-
ture violence in the arrested batterer.87 What these studies
fail to address is how a policy of mandatory arrest might de-
ter would be batterers in the general population. Thus, the
general-specific deterrence distinction reveals the limits of
statistical studies of specific deterrence.88
A fourth reason for mandatory arrest can be found in the
message it conveys to society. As Stark notes, "Making bat-
tering the only crime in which police discretion is removed
acknowledges a special social interest in redressing the leg-
acy of discriminatory treatment of women by law enforce-
ment."89 Thus, mandatory arrest communicates to the society
at large as well as to the batterer and battered person that
battering is a serious crime that will not be tolerated.
Finally, mandatory arrest serves a "redistributive" func-
tion in that police resources are redistributed to women on a
more equal basis. 90 The message is that the police are a re-
80. Id. at 127-29.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 127.
83. See id. at 128.
84. See id.
85. See Stark, supra note 79.
86. See id.
87. For a more in-depth analysis of general versus specific deterrence, see
Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or Perpetua-
tion of the Problem of Abuse, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133 (1994).
88. See id.
89. Stark, supra note 79, at 129.
90. See id.
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source and that battered women have just as much right to
that resource as any other segment of society.
2. Is There a Weakness in the Argument for Mandatory
Arrest?
Fundamental to the argument in favor of mandatory ar-
rest is that it sends an important message to the batterer,
victim, and society.91 Given the power of this argument, crit-
ics have looked for a weakness, arguing that mandatory ar-
rest actually sends the wrong message. 2 For example, critics
have argued that mandatory arrest strips the battered per-
son of her autonomy.93 According to Carol Wright, mandatory
arrest laws take away decision making power from battered
persons and may even force them to prosecute against their
wishes ."'
It is noteworthy that the arguments against mandatory
arrest focus heavily on individual cases. Gelles, for example,
presents anecdotal evidence in which a woman was forced to
"sneak" her husband into her home due to a mandatory ar-
rest law.95 Neighbors, not the battered woman, had called
the police after hearing "loud fights." Apparently neither the
woman nor the man wanted the arrest, so the wife had
"smuggled" her husband into the apartment out of fear that if
the police found the two together, he might be arrested.96
Marion Wanless explains that in a mandatory arrest re-
gime, some women may be reluctant to call the police out of
fear that their husbands might lose their jobs or stop sup-
porting the family.97 Wanless further notes, however, that
women really do not need to choose between abuse and eco-
nomic support, given the availability of battered women's
services and the welfare system. 9
There is little doubt that mandatory arrest will some-
91. See Welch, supra note 87, at 1159.
92. See id.
93. See Carol Wright, Immediate Arrest in Domestic Violence Situations:
Mandate or Alternative, 14 CAP U. L. REV. 243 (1985).
94. Id. at 260.
95. Gelles, supra note 46, at 39.
96. See id.
97. Marion Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domes-
tic Violence, But Is It Enough? U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 549 (1996).
98. Id. Unfortunately, given recent efforts to reduce or restrict welfare,
this argument may have less force in today's environment.
1999]
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times have negative or unintended consequences. In order to
have a rational basis for evaluating mandatory arrest, it is
necessary to examine more carefully some of the counter-ar-
guments.
B. Specific Arguments Against Mandatory Arrest
Among the most severe critics of mandatory arrest are
Eve S. Buzawa and Carl G. Buzawa, noted experts in the
field of the criminal justice response to domestic violence.99
Their arguments center on two issues: 1) the costs of manda-
tory arrest and 2) whether mandatory arrest disempowers
women. o
1. Are the Costs of Mandatory Arrest Too High?
According to Buzawa and Buzawa, mandatory arrest is
not justified, especially for misdemeanors.' These authors
list five costs of mandatory arrest. 11
2
First, these authors argue that mandatory arrest would
increase cost to public agencies because arrest costs are high
and it takes three to four hours to process each arrest.' 3 Sec-
ond, Buzawa and Buzawa maintain that mandatory arrest
entails a number of unintended adverse consequences, such
as police frustration (due to their lack of discretion) and re-
pressive call screening, which would actually reduce the po-
lice response to calls of domestic violence.104
Third, Buzawa and Buzawa argue that mandatory arrest
fails to consider victims' preferences. They state, "A manda-
tory arrest policy may make victims and assailants pawns to
larger policy goals formulated by administrators and well-
meaning victim advocates whose ultimate goals may not even
be shared by that of the victim."'0 ' The ultimate cost, they
argue, is that women lose control." 6 With a loss of control,
women may actually be deterred from calling the police.0 7
99. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 20.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 161.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 161.
104. Id. at 162.
105. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 20, at 162.
106. This is the customary argument. See supra text accompanying notes
95-97.
107. See Eve Buzawa, Police Officer Response to Domestic Violence Legisla-
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Fourth, Buzawa and Buzawa contend that mandatory
arrest may "perversely lessen the inclination of judges to se-
riously treat domestic violence calls, because of the possibil-
ity of ridiculous arrests."' 8
Finally, they argue that mandatory arrest may place too
much power in the hands of the police.' 9 As these authors
note, the police have "historically been unsympathetic to the
needs and goals of abused women.""0 Therefore, the possi-
bility exists that police may "deter victims by not too subtly
hinting that both parties will be arrested if the situation does
not immediately calm down.""'
While it is important to remain cognizant of both sides of
the issue, Buzawa's and Buzawa's arguments fall short on a
number of grounds. First, the extra cost to process violent
crimes should not be a deterrent to arrest. Possible police
frustration or an occasional judge's irritation is not a good
reason to turn our backs on unchecked aggression and vio-
lence. Finally, it is debatable whether mandatory arrest
gives police more power. In her argument against mandatory
arrest, Donna Welch emphasizes that loss of discretion actu-
ally reduces police power, and that the reduction in power is
a major problem with mandatory arrest."2 Arguments based
on cost, frustration, and police power ring hollow compared to
the physical, emotional, and economic costs of battering to
the victims and their families, so there must be a better ar-
gument if we are to take seriously the critics of mandatory
arrest.
2. Does Mandatory Arrest Disempower Women?
Thus far we have seen arguments that mandatory arrest
empowers women."3 Critics of mandatory arrest have argued
to the contrary."' According to Eve Buzawa and her col-
leagues, mandatory arrest deprives women of control over
tion in Michigan, 10 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 415 (1982).
108. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 20, at 163-64.
109. Id. at 164.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Welch, supra note 87.
113. See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
114. See Eve Buzawa et al., The Role Of Arrest In Domestic Versus Stranger
Assault: Is There a Difference, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS
WORK? (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).
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their own destinies, which then reinforces a feeling of pow-
erlessness."' Whether or not Buzawa's argument has valid-
ity, it falls short for at least three subgroups of women: (1)
those women for whom entrapment prevents them from ex-
pressing a preference, (2) women whose cultural norms make
an expression of preference for arrest a betrayal, and (3)
women who do not fully understand the risks they face."6
C. Analysis from a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective
A therapeutic jurisprudence analysis can help bring
some order to the debate over mandatory arrest. Assuming
that we want to (1) enhance and empower battered persons,
(2) restrain and deter batterers, and (3) send a message
throughout society that battering is a crime that will not be
tolerated, how might these goals best be achieved? A thera-
peutic jurisprudence approach would examine how various
police responses affect cognitive processes-to confront the
batterer's faulty thinking patterns and promote adaptive
cognitions in batterers as well as battered persons."'
1. What Does Mandatory Arrest Say to the Battered
Person?
Research on battered persons has failed to reveal a par-
ticular personality type associated with being a victim of bat-
tering. Victims cannot be distinguished from non-victims in
terms of psychological profile or make-up."8 This means that
there is no single profile of a battered woman. Any woman
can be a victim. The problem is not restricted to a small sub-
group of women who exhibit a particular set of personality
characteristics or mental disorder. Thus, mental health
problems of battered women are the result of domestic vio-
lence rather than predisposing factors."9
From a cognitive perspective, battered persons develop a
number of dysfunctional thoughts in which they blame them-
115. Id.
116. See Stark, supra note 79, at 143.
117. See Simon, supra note 26, at 444.
118. See J. Fagan & A. Brown, Violence Between Spouses and Intimates, in 3
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 115-292 (A.
J. Reiss & A. J. Roth eds., 1994).
119. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 75-85
(1984).
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selves, deny or minimize the abuse, and excuse the batterer's
behavior.' The battered person's cognitive distortion"' may
include maladaptive beliefs such as, "if I don't remain in this
relationship, I'm never going to be in another one;"'22 "any
cost is worth paying for a relationship;"'23 or, "it's better to
have an abusive relationship than no relationship at all." 4
The woman may also be thinking thoughts like, "I really am
to blame for this because I knew he was in a bad mood and I
should have kept my mouth shut."2' Other maladaptive
thoughts may include such notions as, "He's really not to
blame for this."'26 Such dysfunctional thoughts not only serve
to keep the battered person from taking steps to change her
situation, but they may also impair her judgment.'27 For ex-
ample, she may ignore signs of danger, or fail to respond in a
way to maximize her safety.'
To deal with these dysfunctional thoughts, a cognitive
approach would utilize techniques such as cognitive restruc-
turing.'29 In cognitive restructuring, an effort is made to
challenge such thoughts and replace them with more effec-
tive ones.3 ° The goal is to assist the individual in ferreting
out dysfunctional thoughts and to replace them with more
realistic and rational beliefs through a process known as dis-
confirmation.' The battered person is taught to treat her
beliefs as hypotheses that can be tested.'32 Self-blame can be
countered by reattributing responsibility for the violence to
the batterer; feelings of helplessness can be countered by
helping the battered person to become aware of her resources
120. See MARY ANN DUTTON, EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATTERED
WOMAN 97-98 (1992).
121. Cognitive distortions are misbeliefs that the person acts upon as though
they were true.
122. DUTTON, supra note 120, at 98.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See DUTTON, supra note 120.
128. See id.
129. See JACQUELINE B. PERSONS, COGNITIVE THERAPY IN PRACTICE: A CASE
FORMULATION APPROACH (1989).
130. See id.
131. See Simon, supra note 26, at 446.
132. See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal
Courts, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 279 (1993).
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and choices."'
Within the cognitive context, mandatory arrest can play
an important role in restructuring the battered person's cog-
nition. It demonstrates that it is the batterer, not she, who is
at fault. It tells her that resources are available, and that
she has choices. Further, it demonstrates that she is not
alone in her plight. As Leonore M. J. Simon has noted,
"[t]reating each act of domestic violence as a criminal act
against the state rather than as merely a family matter is es-
sential in challenging the fear and ambivalence many victims
feel.
134
2. What Does Mandatory Arrest Say to the Batterer?
The police response to domestic violence also affects the
cognitive response of the batter. When the police fail to re-
spond adequately or minimize the severity of their violence,
batterers may develop cognitive distortions.'' They may see
an ineffective police response as justification for their con-
duct." Alternatively, an ineffective police response may re-
inforce the batterer's failure to assume responsibility for his
actions.'37 An inadequate police response may also lead to
distortions that either minimize, in the mind of the batterer,
the effect of violence, or dehumanize or blame the victim.'38
As Eva Jefferson Paterson stated, when police fail to arrest:
men.., get the message from police officers that women
battering is not a crime and that the sanctions of the
criminal justice system-sanctions which presumably ex-
ist to deter and punish those who have the inclination to
behave in antisocial ways-are routinely not invoked by
police officers and that therefore they have nothing to fear
if they beat the woman with whom they are, or were, in-
volved.
139
From a cognitive and therapeutic jurisprudence perspec-
tive, when police respond ineffectively, slowly, or not at all,
offenders are reinforced to deny their behavior while the bat-
133. See id.
134. Simon, supra note 26, at 446.
135. See Fagan & Brown, supra note 119.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. Eva Jefferson Patterson, How the Legal System Responds to Battered
Women, in BATTERED WOMEN 79, 82-83 (Donna M. Moore ed., 1979).
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tered person continues to feel a sense of helplessness.140
Through mandatory arrest, police can help challenge and dis-
confirm entrenched and ingrained dysfunctional thoughts,
such as "There is nothing wrong with what I'm doing." 4'
Moreover, when the police take the offender into custody,
they give a clear message to the batterer, as well as to the
battered person, that he has committed a criminal act for
which he is responsible.'42 By contrast, failure to arrest
would facilitate offender denial,'43 as well as encourage the
battered person's feelings of helplessness and self-blame.'
Another advantage of mandatory arrest, from a thera-
peutic jurisprudence perspective, is that it can validate the
battered person's right to be free from personal violence. 4' In
short, when the police fail to respond adequately, the effect is
anti-therapeutic; whereas mandatory arrest has many posi-
tive effects in terms of discouraging the maladaptive cogni-
tions that led to battering.
3. What Does Mandatory Arrest Say to Society?
Mandatory arrest sends a message to society that domes-
tic violence is a crime that will not be tolerated and that soci-
ety does not blame the victim for her predicament.'46 As
Marion Wanless noted, "The continuing failure to consis-
tently make arrests signifies that society still considers do-
mestic abuse a permissible act rather than a crime....
Mandatory arrest signals that domestic violence is a crime
with attendant consequences. '47
Present societal organization and traditional stereotypic
views of women support domestic violence.'48 The fact is, do-
mestic violence is a crime of violence. As such, it victimizes
all of society, because everyone is less secure when violence
140. See David A. Ford, Wife Battery and Criminal Justice: A Study of Victim
Decision-Making, 32 FAM. REL. 463 (1983).
141. Simon, supra note 26, at 447.
142. See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent
Effects of Arrest for Domestic Asault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984).
143. See David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Criminal Justice Mental Health Issues, 16 MENTAL AND PHYsICAL DISABILITY
L. REPORTER 225 (1992).
144. See DUTTON, supra note 120, at 77-79.
145. See Simon, supra note 26, at 447.
146. See Welch, supra note 87, at 1152.
147. Wanless, supra note 97, at 553-54.
148. See id.
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reigns unchecked. Messages consistent with a therapeutic
jurisprudence approach, such as that conveyed by a manda-
tory arrest policy, can help to change the climate that sup-
ports domestic violence.
IV. PROPOSAL
While mandatory arrest is not a "panacea,"149 has certain
drawbacks,15 ° and has not been conclusively shown to have a
deterring effect on recidivism,"' it has major advantages from
a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective. 5 ' Measures short of
mandatory arrest risk sending the wrong messages. Manda-
tory arrest, by contrast, signals positive and constructive
messages to the offender, battered person, and society. These
messages can lay the groundwork for breaking the cycle of
battering, help the battered person overcome maladaptive
thoughts, and clear the way for a societal response that it
will no longer tolerate this crime. Thus, from a therapeutic
jurisprudence perspective, mandatory arrest should be
adopted.
Critics have argued that police officers must have some
discretion due to the uniqueness and variations of cases in-
volving domestic violence."3 The response to this criticism is
that mandatory arrest "ensures a consistent police response
on which victims can rely.""4 Moreover, the police do main-
tain some discretion, since they must ascertain that there is
probable cause to make an arrest.15' Thus under mandatory
arrest, police still have sufficient flexibility to prevent abuses
such as use of the law for revenge or retaliation by women
who would make false claims."6
Again, it is important to emphasize that mandatory ar-
rest will not solve all problems and will, of course, create
some of its own." 7 Therefore, we must continuously strive for
a comprehensive solution to domestic violence. One such so-
149. See id. at 568.
150. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 135-141.
153. Welch, supra note 87.
154. Wanless, supra note 97, at 568.
155. See Nancy James, Domestic Violence: A History of Arrest Policies and a
Survey of Modern Laws, 28 FAM. L. Q. 509 (1994).
156. See Wanless, supra note 97, at 568.
157. See text accompanying notes 109-112.
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lution is that mandatory arrest should be coupled with a co-
ordinated program.'58 Such a program should involve a high
level of community awareness, police training, and the appli-
cation of therapeutic jurisprudence to other aspects of the
criminal justice system, such as the prosecutorial response to
domestic violence.
A. Police Training and Awareness
It is widely known that police tend to treat batterers less
severely than comparable perpetrators of violence against
strangers."9 As Joan Zorza has noted, police have tradition-
ally been taught that domestic violence is a private matter.1
60
Even where there has been reform, inconsistencies exist in
how police react to the batterer or battered person.' Thus,
there is a continuing need for police training and awareness
programs.
The way police respond to a battered person can be det-
rimental as well as therapeutic. Where police blame or dis-
parage a battered person, they may reinforce her feelings of
low self-esteem and isolation.'6' Police must be made aware
of the significance of the manner in which they respond to the
battered person and must learn more effective responses. As
Leonore M. J. Simon has noted, "Police training could make
officers more sensitive and helpful to victims. Training could
address general aspects of the dynamics of domestic violence,
the potential lethality of these cases, services available for
battered women and their children, and the legal obligation
to provide protection.''
An important issue in police training concerns the
threshold for arrest. Marion Wanless offers a good sugges-
tion for a brightline rule.'64 Wanless recommends that police
158. See Welch, supra note 87, at 1164.
159. See James, supra note 155 (citing Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of
Misdemeanor Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47 (1992).
As Zorza notes, police are generally "indifferent" to domestic violence.
160. Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, 10 CRIM. JUST. 2
(1992).
161. See Timothy J. Moroney, Domestic Violence-Protective Orders and Ar-
rest Policies, 27 PAC. L.J. 790 (1985).
162. See K. Ferraro, Police Woman Battering, 36 SoC. PROBS. 61 (1989).
163. Simon, supra note 26, at 448 (citing EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE vii-xii (1992).
164. Wanless, supra note 97, at 569.
1999]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
be trained to arrest whenever the batterer physically injures
the victim.' 61  Wanless further argues that physical injury
should be defined broadly, to include even minimal redness
or swelling. 166
A second important issue concerns discerning the pri-
mary aggressor. The primary aggressor is the person who
caused the incident, even if both parties are injured.'67 Iden-
tifying the primary abuser is especially important from a
therapeutic jurisprudence perspective when considering the
message of mutual arrest. By labeling both parties as abus-
ers, mutual arrest sends the message that both parties are to
blame. Such a message allows continued cognitive distortion
on the part of the batterer because he now has a good reason
to deny responsibility for his acts. Perhaps worse, the mes-
sage to the battered person can only serve to confuse and
humiliate her.
Police training, while an important step, is perhaps best
thought as only one of many steps that can be taken from a
therapeutic jurisprudence perspective. Reform in this area
should extend training and awareness throughout the crimi-
nal justice system.
B. Applications Beyond the Police Response: The Prosecution
The prosecutorial response to domestic violence can also
have positive or negative therapeutic implications. Prosecu-
tors have considerable discretion in the exercise of their pow-
ers.' 68 Lenient treatment conveys the message that the vio-
lence is trivial.'6  The batterer can, therefore, continue with
his cognitive distortions and denial of responsibility. Equally
damaging is the message to the battered person that her
plight is of little importance and will not be taken seriously.
Consequently, she will continue to harbor feelings of self-
blame and hopelessness.' 9 Further, a weak prosecutorial re-
sponse may foster the batterer's distorted perception that
165. Id.
166. Id. at 570.
167. See id. Wanless offers four factors that police would consider in deter-
mining who to arrest: (1) comparative severity of injury, (2) history of violence
between the parties, (3) did either party act in self-defense, and (4) the likeli-
hood of future injury. Id.
168. See e.g., Bordenkirscher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 352 (1978).
169. See Simon, supra note 26.
170. See id.
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there is nothing wrong with his behavior, and thus encourage
him to maintain his destructive behavioral pattern. 171 With a
better understanding of therapeutic jurisprudence, prosecu-
tors may vigorously prosecute batters. Such a response can
help the batterer take more responsibility for his conduct.'72
As with the police, prosecutors can benefit from training
and awareness programs.' A strong, consistent prosecuto-
rial response can help empower women by modifying their
faulty belief that they are responsible for the violence di-
rected toward them. "4 When prosecutors request a tough
sentence, they educate the batterer as well as the victim and
society about the seriousness of their crime."'
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, treatment for the batterer and battered person
does not begin in a psychotherapy clinic. It begins on the
scene, with the police, and continues throughout the proc-
essing of the batterer in the criminal justice system. By
making effective use of concepts of therapeutic jurisprudence
it may be possible not only to begin the process of reeducation
of the batterer and healing of the battered person at the mo-
ment of police contact, but also to set the right tone for
change in the twenty-first century.
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